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The Centre for Tax System Integrity (CTSI) is a specialised research unit set up as a 
partnership between the Australian National University (ANU) and the Australian Taxation 
Office (Tax Office) to extend our understanding of how and why cooperation and 
contestation occur within the tax system.  
 
This series of working papers is designed to bring the research of the Centre for Tax 
System Integrity to as wide an audience as possible and to promote discussion among 
researchers, academics and practitioners both nationally and internationally on taxation 
compliance. 
 
The working papers are selected with three criteria in mind: (1) to share knowledge, 
experience and preliminary findings from research projects; (2) to provide an outlet for 
policy focused research and discussion papers; and (3) to give ready access to previews of 
papers destined for publication in academic journals, edited collections, or research 
monographs. 
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Abstract 
 
This paper analyses taxpaying as a threatening experience that intrudes on freedom and 
financial well-being. A new model (ROAM – regulation through self, oppression and 
autonomy) is proposed to explain why enforcement activity by tax authorities can generate 
outcomes that are counterproductive in eliciting future compliance. Responsive regulation 
is proposed as an approach that allows tax authorities to understand the mentalities of those 
they wish to regulate, to gain greater insight into the workings of the tax system, both 
positive and negative, to engender greater commitment to the system and to deliver higher 
compliance. 
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The threat of taxation: Management by responsive regulation 
 
Valerie Braithwaite, Kristina Murphy and Monika Reinhart 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Individuals have very different views about the tax they pay. Some regard taxation as a 
way of contributing to the public good. Others view it less charitably as little more than 
government extortion. Regardless of where one stands, tax collection threatens individuals, 
financially and politically (Kirchler, 1998). At the most basic level, people forego earnings 
or wealth to pay tax, and most have little choice in doing so. Those who refuse to pay their 
taxes risk going down a path of conflict with the Australian Taxation Office (Tax Office), 
involving amended assessments, fines, and legal proceedings, all of which incur costs, 
ostensibly financial, but surreptitiously, psychological and social. Rightly or wrongly, 
taxpayers like to stay below the radar of tax officialdom: They know tax authorities as 
powerful agencies, large impersonal bureaucracies, that take rather than give, and that take 
without consultation or consideration (National Commission on Restructuring the Internal 
Revenue Service, 1997).  
 
It is not surprising, therefore, that taxpayers who come under the scrutiny of tax 
administrators tend to experience high levels of stress (Commonwealth Ombusdsman, 
1999; IRS Customer Service Task Force, 1997; Joint Committee of Public Accounts 
Report, 1993; National Commission on Restructuring the Internal Revenue Service, 1997; 
Office of Public Affairs, 2002). This paper examines one such group caught in publicly 
controversial mass marketed tax avoidance schemes in Australia. The paper examines the 
psychology of this group of taxpayers, offended by their depiction as ‘tax cheats,’ and 
politically active in resisting the amended tax assessments issued by the tax authority 
(Senate Economics References Committee, 2002). The central argument is that taxpayers, 
as human beings with an unswerving desire to make sense of what is happening to them in 
order to restore their sense of self-worth and well-being (Allport, 1961; McDougall, 1926; 
Maruna, 2001), manage tax authority threat in ways that can be deceptive to those who 
design and administer tax systems.  
 
A newly developed model, ROAM (Regulation through Self, Oppression and Autonomy 
 2
Mentalities), has been developed to explain a phenomenon observed in earlier regulatory 
work and defined as motivational posturing (Braithwaite, 1995; Braithwaite, Braithwaite, 
Gibson & Makkai, 1994). Posturing represents the social and relational signals that 
individuals send to others and to the authority to communicate preferred social distance 
from that authority. ROAM unveils ways of interpreting the threat of taxation – a threat to 
one’s purse and to one’s liberty. These three threat mentalities play a major role in defining 
social distance and postures. Through examining the mentalities that people adopt in 
response to tax threat and the posturing they adopt in relation to authority, we hope to 
explain how regulators can unwittingly elevate threat levels so as to lose control of the 
outcomes of enforcement. Responsive regulation is advocated as an approach that allows 
authorities to understand and manage threat and posturing so that their enforcement efforts 
are not counterproductive. 
 
The paper is organised into five sections. Section II sets out the argument for why 
responsive regulation has a role to play in reforming taxation administration as well as tax 
policy and law. In tax regimes around the world, interventions tend to be seen as heavy-
handed (Joint Committee of Public Accounts Report, 1993; National Commission on 
Restructuring the Internal Revenue Service, 1997) with taxpayers often unsure of how to 
stay out of trouble (Center for Tax Policy and Administration, 2001; Office of Public 
Affairs, 2002). Responsive regulation is an approach that encourages a regulator to seek 
the least interventionist strategy to elicit compliance, while having a set of options for 
intervention that show ever increasing levels of intrusiveness should the ‘lighter touch’ 
fail. The basic principle of responsive regulation is that neither persuasion nor punishment 
is sufficient for effective regulation: Persuasion and punishment together need to be 
strategically coordinated. Persuasion and punishment are most likely to be mutually 
reinforcing and respectful of democratic deliberation when persuasion takes precedence, 
and punishment becomes a back-up measure should persuasion fail. 
 
Section III provides a theoretical framework for analysing taxation threat in the form of the 
ROAM model. Threat refers to an event that potentially inflicts loss or harm on a person. 
Taxation poses threat at the most basic level through depriving a person of income and 
wealth, regardless of whether that person likes it or not. The threat is heightened for 
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taxpayers when conflict arises over the amount of tax that should be paid. Through 
comparing a group of taxpayers who had been sent amended assessments by the tax 
authority because of their involvement in mass marketed tax avoidance schemes with 
taxpayers who had never experienced conflict with the tax authority, hypotheses relating to 
taxpayer threat and its consequences for posturing are set out for empirical verification.  
 
Section IV describes the research methodology and presents the results of analyses 
showing heightened threat of different kinds among scheme investors. Also examined in 
Section IV is the role of procedural justice in building cooperative relations with taxpayers. 
Procedural justice refers to the fairness of the process of conflict resolution and 
enforcement, with particular reference to whether or not taxpayers felt their case was dealt 
with respectfully and without bias or prejudice, and whether or not the authority honoured 
the taxpayers’ charter of rights.  
 
Section V brings the argument back to responsive regulation as a means of restoring the 
legitimacy of the authority of the Tax Office among those who are in the process of losing 
confidence in the system and in the justice it delivers. 
 
II. Responsive regulation and threat management 
 
Regulatory formalism versus responsive regulation 
 
In Restorative Justice and Responsive Regulation, John Braithwaite (2002) has pitted 
regulatory formalism against responsive regulation. An agency that can list its problems in 
advance, specify the appropriate response and generate manuals of rules to mandate these 
responses is structured along formalist lines. Tax authorities fit this description: and for 
good reason. Relatively speaking, Australia has a low population, but even here the Tax 
Office employs some 20 thousand staff to deal with over 10 million taxpayers, and each 
year these staff are confronted with millions of tax lodgments that need to be processed 
and screened; an enormous task even within the self-regulatory tax framework of self-
assessment.  
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On the taxpayers’ side, most Australians have little interaction with the tax authority, the 
main exception being an eagerly anticipated tax refund which 75% receive after an annual 
tax lodgment has been processed (Australian Taxation Office, 2002a). Some 77% of 
Australians keep their distance from the Tax Office through seeking the support of a tax 
professional to act as a go-between (Australian Taxation Office, 2002a; Braithwaite, 
Reinhart, Mearns & Graham, 2001). Tax professionals are valued for their capacity to deal 
with tax matters with the minimum of fuss (Sakurai & Braithwaite, 2003). But they are 
also valued because they are able to buffer the individual in the event of misunderstanding 
with the tax authority. Because of the complexity of the tax code (see Job, Stout & Smith, 
this issue; Picciotto, this issue), errors in completion of tax returns are not unusual: They 
may be intentional with knowledge of risk, intentional without knowledge of risk, or 
unintentional.  
 
Commonly, anomalies in tax returns are detected through computer-based analyses, 
comparing databases, and using data mining procedures to throw up anything that looks 
suspicious. On routine matters, the process is fully automated, as are the computer 
generated letters that inform us that we have omitted to comply with our legal obligations, 
and that we owe the tax authority money, plus interest and a penalty that must be paid by a 
due date if we are to avoid legal action. Our circumstances, the reasons for our incorrect 
lodgment, and the personal consequences do not enter into the tax authority’s 
consciousness.  
 
It is not that the Tax Office is without capacity for conscious awareness and consideration 
of such issues. Australia follows OECD best practice (Committee of Fiscal Affairs, 1990), 
and like other countries has a Taxpayers’ Charter (Australian Taxation Office, 1997) that 
commits the agency to showing reasonable levels of care and consideration in dealing with 
taxpayers. The issue is more that capacity for regulatory responsiveness is by-passed in 
favour of regulatory formalism in the interests of efficiency. An automatic data processing 
function enables the tax authority to process a large number of tax lodgments in a timely, 
impartial and fully accountable fashion. 
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Regulatory formalism of this kind works well most of the time. This is not to say that the 
process cannot be finessed through taking on board some of the principles of good 
regulatory practice developed by such scholars as Bardach and Kagan (1982), Kagan and 
Scholz (1984) and Tyler (1990, 1997). For example, automated letters from enforcement 
agencies do not have to be couched in legally dense and unfamiliar language, making them 
incomprehensible to ordinary people, nor do they have to be accusatory and offensive in 
tone. Regulatory formalism does not preclude fair and respectful treatment of taxpayers 
(Bentley, 1998). 
 
Humanising ‘regulatory formalism,’ however, is not the intent of this paper, as important 
as it is. Others have risen to the challenge within the Tax Office of adjusting regulatory 
formalism so that it is offering procedural justice that is discernible and valued by 
taxpayers and the regulatory community at large (Murphy, 2003a, 2004a). Rather, the 
argument is that tax authorities should be able to operate a triage system, so that Tax 
Office functioning above and beyond the basic mass level of automated processing can be 
structured to make room for responsive regulation. These are the levels at which there is 
moral ambiguity about what is right and wrong, or where the automated regulatory system 
is causing more problems than it solves. The areas listed here are not exhaustive, but for 
illustrative purposes include ambiguous or grey areas of tax law, complaint resolution, and 
serious non-compliance. In each of these areas, formalists may defend their capacity to 
deliver consistent, transparent and impartial decisions. But what needs to be considered is 
that these objectives may be achieved at substantial costs. Taxpayers may judge the 
decisions as being consistently ill-informed, consistently out of touch, consistently 
unreasonable, and consistently unfair. Advocates of regulatory formalism in taxation 
thereby run the risk of inadvertently jeopardising the authoritativeness and legitimacy of 
the institution in the eyes of the public (Murphy, 2004b). 
 
It is in the above contexts that responsive regulation needs to make its presence felt in tax 
administration. Regulatory formalism imposes order on a dispute, but fails to evoke the 
taxpayers’ sensibility of what justice is all about, leaving behind individuals who can 
attach meaning to their experience from their own perspective but not from an institutional 
or collective perspective. The contrast between a taxpayer who fails to declare her bank 
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interest on her income tax return and an investor who enters a newly advertised tax 
minimisation scheme that turns out to be illegal serves to illustrate the point being made 
here. Omitting bank interest may be a mistake, but it is in a category of mistakes familiar 
to us. We’d rather it not happen, we may protest and complain bitterly that it was just a 
stupid error, but at the end of the day there is a shared social reference point for our 
‘wrongdoing.’  
 
By way of contrast, there are encounters that people have with the law for which they are 
not prepared and for which there is no shared social reference point. There is no sensibility 
about the function the law serves, people are not even sure they have broken the law, and 
there is no rehearsed script for how they or the authority should deal with this conduct that 
is purported to be unacceptable. Short of blind faith that the authority will always act in a 
just and fair way, individuals caught in such situations have every reason to be fearful. The 
threat they experience is not part of a narrative that they have heard before. The threat 
mushrooms because it is ‘new,’ not only to the taxpayers, but also to the tax administrators.  
 
Through demonstrating the extent and nature of the threat among taxpayers caught up in 
mass marketed tax avoidance schemes, we hope to illustrate why responsive regulation 
may be helpful in handling problems that arise around ‘new issues’ that regularly erupt in 
interpreting tax law (see Picciotto, this issue and Rawlings, this issue for a discussion of 
these tax complexities).  
 
What responsive regulation has to offer 
 
Responsive regulation is an approach that acknowledges that ‘changing the flow of events’ 
(Parker & Braithwaite, 2003) inevitably involves changing the ways in which other human 
beings believe the flow of events can and should be changed. Regulatory authorities, if 
they have an interest in predicting the outcomes of their interventions, need to understand 
the narratives of those whom they are trying to regulate. Responsive regulation, through its 
emphasis on dialogue and persuasion, allows ‘regulatory conversation’ (Black, 1998) to 
take place. As a result, both sides of the regulatory conversation understand the position of 
the other, the arguments for and against are fully aired and considered, and a shared 
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understanding emerges of the probable steps of escalation should the conflict remain 
unresolved. Responsive regulation therefore offers procedural clarity with explanations for 
the decisions and actions taken. And importantly, regulatory arguments, for and against, 
become available for inclusion in the taxpayers’ narratives about their predicament. It is 
true that threat may turn into anger as a consequence of these deliberations. But equally 
true is the proposition that threat may turn into acceptance and acknowledgment from the 
taxpayer that she did not act in the wisest of ways. Regulatory conversation gives 
opportunity for diffusing threat. Without regulatory conversation, threat has nowhere to go 
but to fear, frustration, anger, and despair. 
 
Responsive regulation offers more, however, as a means of managing psychological threat. 
The approach allows intervention at any number of levels from the least intrusive level to 
the highly intrusive level of incapacitation. This means that taxpayers who are willing to 
make amends, accept responsibility for their actions, and get it right next time can be dealt 
with differently from taxpayers who are intent on delaying procedures and avoiding the 
issues – or fleeing the country. Their crimes may not differ, but how the tax authority 
manages these cases lies well within their domain of responsibility. There is considerable 
scope for using responsive regulation and a regulatory pyramid of escalated sanctioning 
within tax authorities as the mass-marketed tax avoidance scheme case study below 
demonstrates. The objective is to appeal to the self-regulating capacity of the individual, 
either through social responsibility or through self-interest, convincing taxpayers that the 
best outcome lies in resolving the conflict at the bottom of the pyramid (Ayres & 
Braithwaite, 1992). Failure to do so will result in an escalation of penalties and costs that 
are not in the interests of the taxpayer or the tax authority. Through this process, 
individuals can choose the point at which they settle their dispute. They are not forced to 
endure the threat of protracted conflict if they don’t want to. 
 
Being able to intervene at multiple levels brings greater decision making responsibility to 
regulators – they must arrive at an action plan that will elicit compliance – and this means 
the regulator must be well informed about the context in which non-compliance has 
occurred. Knowledge of what has been happening in the regulatory community provides an 
opportunity for regulators to identify compliance problems before they take hold, and 
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allows for a regulatory community to be gently turned away from harmful practices in the 
early stages, allowing cooperative relations to prevail. In the field of taxation where the 
next tax avoidance scheme is sitting in a bottom drawer waiting to be implemented 
(Braithwaite, 2005), partnerships that keep information flowing around the regulatory 
community are invaluable. There is a chance of averting threat to taxpayers when their 
investments go awry through Tax Office decisions, as well as to tax administrators when 
they realise a scheme has got out of hand. In this sense, responsive regulation adds to the 
future sustainability of a tax system: Changes in process and design can proceed in an 
evolutionary way rather than through the ‘fits and starts’ accompanying crisis 
management. 
 
In summarising the case for responsive regulation as a means of effectively managing 
taxpayer threat and stress, the keyword is understanding – understanding the taxpayer’s 
mentality and environment and using this knowledge, rather than a rulebook, to turn non-
compliance into compliance. To opt for the rulebook may be easier, but there is now 
considerable evidence casting doubt on its effectiveness (see Williams, 2001 for an 
Australian taxation example). At no time is this more so than when the rules seem arbitrary 
and senseless. A process that gives the rules meaning and acceptance is a prerequisite to a 
process that imposes order on tax collection activities, at least this is so if our normative 
position supports the preservation and promotion of a deliberative democratic state 
(Braithwaite, 2003; Braithwaite & Pettit, 1990; Dryzek, 1990). 
 
III. Theorising and contextualising taxation threat 
 
From motivational postures to ROAM threat 
 
In earlier work on nursing home regulation, social distancing or rift was found when 
nursing home directors and inspectors failed to believe in the goals of the regulators and 
lost trust and confidence in the regulatory process (Braithwaite et al., 1994; Braithwaite, 
1995). Over time, however, the rift was healed, most commonly in cases where differences 
had arisen over process, and regulators had given the nursing home directors the 
opportunity to make the changes required and adjust to the new inspection process. The rift 
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did not heal, however, in cases where nursing home directors had lost hope in the 
regulatory system, its goals and its processes.  
 
These two different types of response to unwelcome regulatory criticism were 
differentiated using the concept of motivational posturing (Braithwaite et al., 1994). 
Motivational posturing comprised attitudes, beliefs, feelings and interests that together 
presented a public statement describing how regulatees saw their relationship with the 
regulator and the social distance (Bogardus, 1928) that they placed between themselves 
and the authority. Social distance was reflected in terms of a favourable attitude of liking 
versus an unfavourable attitude of disliking. The postures of commitment and capitulation 
reflected the former end of the dimension, resistance the latter end. In recent work, these 
postures have been combined into a supra-posture of resistance-cooperation (Braithwaite, 
2001a, 2004). Resistance is the posture that is most amenable to change, particularly if 
regulators are reasonable and fair in their treatment of those who are not in compliance 
with the law (Braithwaite et al., 1994; Murphy, 2003a, 2004a). 
 
Also important was a second dimension, reflecting the degree to which the regulatee was 
prepared to ascribe status to the authority. In cases where the regulatee dismissed the 
authority of the regulator, the motivational posture was described as disengaged. Since the 
original work, a second posture involving challenge to the authority of the regulator has 
been added called game playing (McBarnet, 2003). Disengagement and game playing form 
the supra-posture of dissociation. This posture has been associated with persistent 
unwillingness to cooperate or comply with regulatory authorities (Braithwaite et al., 1995; 
Braithwaite, 2001a, 2004). 
 
The value of this research was to demonstrate that behavioural acts of non-compliance are 
accompanied by different compliance mentalities, and if the intent is to ‘change the flow of 
events,’ regulators must be able to differentiate these mentalities and engage with non-
compliant regulatees in ways that will open the channels of communication. The value of 
regulators having a sensibility about mindset has been documented extensively in the 
regulatory literature (Bardach & Kagan, 1982; Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992). Stories of the 
ways in which regulators nudged regulatees towards compliance, using just enough 
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pressure while avoiding counter-productive heavy-handed treatment formed the 
observational data on which the theory of responsive regulation was based (Braithwaite, 
1985; Grabosky & Braithwaite, 1986).  
 
What has remained tangential to this body of work is the explanation for why ‘nudging’ 
works better for regulators than ‘coercing.’ A number of theories have been used with 
success to explain the phenomenon. Brehm & Brehm (1981) have been influential in 
demonstrating experimentally the phenomenon of reactance, a form of resistance to 
authority that takes hold when people feel that their freedom is being threatened (see 
Kirchler, 1999 for an application to taxation). In order to explain reactance against 
authority, Taylor (Taylor & McGarty, 2001; Taylor 2003) has drawn on self-categorisation 
theory, arguing that an ‘us-them’ dichotomy between those with power and those without 
will do little to win support for the authority’s agenda. Wenzel (this issue) also has drawn 
on this theoretical approach to explain how identities shape our understanding of justice, 
which in turn, determines how cooperative or resistant we are likely to be in relation to an 
authority’s demands. Braithwaite (1989) and Sherman (1993) have taken another tack. 
They have argued that the experience of shaming can give rise to defiance among 
regulatees, if the experience is stigmatising rather than reintegrative, and if regulatees fail 
to see the process as legitimate.  
 
The present theoretical approach differs from these other approaches, although there are 
common themes. Conceiving of taxation as an event that potentially threatens an 
individual’s well-being, stress and coping theory is used as a base to postulate a 
psychological process of taxation threat appraisal. The basic idea is that individuals deal 
with the threat of taxation through constructing a narrative, developed from knowledge 
acquired within the regulatory community. When taxation becomes a salient issue for 
them, their preferred narratives come into play, with preference depending on both 
personal and contextual factors. These narratives that provide an appraisal and coping 
strategy for dealing with the threat of taxation have implications for relationships with the 
authority. Individuals will adjust their social distance from the authority, and their 
posturing will reflect the message that they want to send about the social distance that is 
comfortable for them. 
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Three modes of threat appraisal and coping responsiveness that have been documented 
across different contexts appear to be particularly relevant to analysing taxation threat. 
Threats may be dealt with using emotion-focused styles, problem-focused styles, or 
through a process of cognitive reframing (Antonovsky, 1979; Carver & Scheier, 1998; 
Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Pearlin & Schooler, 1978). An emotion-focused response to a 
threat might involve displays of anger, distress, or feelings of helplessness. When taxation 
is analysed through an emotion-focused lens, the most likely response is victimisation or 
oppression. Taxpayers experience a sense of loss that they are unable to change, but that 
they feel is undesirable, unjustified and unfair.  
 
In contrast, a problem-focused approach to threat involves actively looking for solutions, 
drawing on different resources to bring the threatening situation under control. Taxpayers 
who engage professionals and talk to colleagues about tax minimisation are being problem-
focused in dealing with taxation threat. In other words, they are not prepared to accept their 
tax burden, instead taking up the challenge of finding ways to reduce the amount they have 
to pay. Those who are problem-focused assert their autonomy against the threat of taxation. 
 
The third way of dealing with a threatening situation is to reframe it so that it becomes an 
accepted, if not tolerable part of one’s life. In order to reframe, the threatening situation is 
imbued with new meaning. In the case of taxation, we see ourselves contributing to the 
overall good of society. We do not lose out to the taxation system, but rather we benefit 
from the privileges and amenities it bestows on our community. And what of the 
punitiveness of the tax system? How do we reframe this threat to our well-being? 
Interestingly, we negate neither its presence nor its seriousness. But we do construct an 
identity for ourselves that is safe from its reach. Through reframing taxation as a social 
good and aligning ourselves with the authority that delivers that social good, we set 
ourselves safely apart from those disgruntled and difficult taxpayers to whom fines, 
sanctions and legal action are meant to apply. Changing oneself and one’s place in the 
world in order to render the threat of taxation benign has earned this mindset the 
description of regulation through self. 
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The regulation through self, oppression and autonomy mentalities (ROAM) have been 
measured through a number of self-contained tax attitude scales (for details see 
Braithwaite, 2001b, forthcoming). As might be expected in a law enforcement context, the 
strongest mentality is regulation through self. The weakest is autonomy, and oppression 
occupies the middle ground. The mentalities of regulation through self, oppression and 
autonomy are not theorised as being mutually exclusive. All are protective of our sense of 
self-regard and well-being so that it is in our interests to be adaptive and to use whichever 
protective mechanism works best in the circumstances. 
 
In research with the general population of taxpayers, regulation through self predicts 
cooperation with a tax authority and indicates a willingness to recognise the status of the 
authority. Oppression reduces cooperation and gives rise to resistance, sometimes even 
predisposing individuals to stepping outside the system and challenging authority. 
Mounting a challenge to the authority involves no longer ascribing status to that authority 
in the regulatory community. The mentality of autonomy combined with a decimated 
mentality of regulation through self is a forerunner of the state of relational breakdown that 
we call dissociation (Braithwaite, 2004; forthcoming). 
 
When the taxation threat is heightened because we come under scrutiny of the tax 
authority, it is likely that all three mentalities would become stronger – whatever works to 
relieve the stress. This being the case, the degree to which traditional enforcement 
practices will result in future cooperation and compliance will surely be highly variable. 
Some will become more cooperative, some more resistant, some less dissociated, others 
more so. Amidst the chaos, tax administrators have the task of establishing the best 
outcomes for the tax system that they possible can. Before empirically examining their 
success, particularly in relation to the delivery of procedural justice, the Tax Office’s 
management of the mass marketed tax avoidance schemes needs to be described. 
 
Managing the mass-marketed tax avoidance schemes  
 
In June 1998, Australia’s Commissioner of Taxation announced that the Tax Office would 
be implementing a series of initiatives aimed at combating aggressive tax planning. Part of 
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their crackdown on aggressive tax planning involved issuing amended assessments to tens 
of thousands of taxpayers involved in mass marketed tax avoidance schemes. The view 
was that taxpayers who became involved in these schemes did so for the ‘dominant 
purpose’ of obtaining a tax benefit, and as a result the anti-avoidance provisions of Part 
IVA of the Australian Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 applied. The anti-avoidance 
provisions give the Tax Office the power to recover a taxpayers’ tax shortfall with interest 
and penalties for a period of up to six years after the initial tax deduction was first claimed. 
 
The Tax Office’s concerns over aggressive tax planning first arose in 1996 out of its 
analysis of internal and external information that showed a dramatic increase in the number 
of taxpayers involved in scheme arrangements. This coincided with an increase in the 
amounts being claimed as tax deductions. Scheme related tax deductions were found to 
increase from AUD$54 million in the 1993-94 income year to over AUD$1 billion in the 
1997-98 income year.  
 
In order to address the problem and discourage future marketing and investment in such 
arrangements, enforcement action was taken against the 42 000 participants thought to 
already be involved in such schemes. The Tax Office recognised that an unusually broad 
spectrum of people had been caught up in the mass marketed schemes, from middle 
income taxpayers (for example, school teachers and miners) through to the wealthy (for 
example, professionals, sports celebrities). Under the law, a statutory culpability penalty of 
50 per cent of the tax shortfall usually applies to taxpayers involved in tax avoidance. 
However, given the nature of the taxpayers involved, the Tax Office reduced this figure to 
10% by giving investors the opportunity to make a voluntary disclosure about their tax 
affairs.  Participants were also advised that a General Interest Charge on the tax shortfall 
(at a rate of 13.86% per annum) would still be payable from the due date of the original 
assessment to the date of issue of the amended assessment (in some cases up to six years). 
The retrospective application of the interest charge served to inflate many debts.   
 
Investor responses towards the Tax Office’s initial enforcement approach were hostile. 
Investors resented the implication that they were ‘tax cheats,’ and were disappointed that 
they had not been consulted over the matter (Murphy, 2003a). Taxpayers argued that 
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accountants and financial planners had sold them the schemes as a way of legitimately 
minimising tax, while still enabling them to make a long-term investment. During much of 
1998 and 1999, therefore, thousands of investors made complaints to the Commonwealth 
Ombudsman about the handling of their case, various legal fighting funds were set up to 
represent investors’ interests, and the majority refused to pay back their scheme related tax 
debts. The dispute between the taxpayers and the Tax Office culminated in a parliamentary 
enquiry (Senate Economics References Committee, 2002).  
 
In response to both the Senate Committee’s report and the continued resistance exhibited 
by scheme investors in April 2001, the Tax Office announced a reduction of the interest 
rate for some scheme related tax debts. The General Interest Charge of 13.86 per cent was 
reduced to a rate of 5.86 per cent. The reduction only applied if the taxpayer entered into a 
settlement arrangement. Even with this offer, however, the majority of taxpayers continued 
to resist the Tax Office’s attempts to recover their outstanding tax debts. 
 
In February 2002, in an attempt to finally resolve the matter, the Tax Office offered 
another opportunity for settlement. The Tax Office acknowledged that many investors had 
been the victims of bad advice. For those who were eligible (accountants, financial 
planners and tax lawyers were ineligible), this final settlement allowed the claiming of 
actual cash outlays as a tax deduction, the abolishing of interest and penalty on the tax 
debt, and a 2-year interest free period in which to repay the remaining tax shortfall (in most 
circumstances this offer halved taxpayers’ original debt). Taxpayers were given two 
months to decide whether they would take up the offer, after which time, full penalties and 
interest would be reapplied. The Tax Office later extended the offer for an extra three 
weeks so that taxpayers could take into account the outcome of two court cases that ruled 
in favour of the Tax Office. After four years of active resistance, 87 per cent of all 
investors finally agreeing to settle their debt (Australian Taxation Office, 2002b). 
 
Hypotheses 
 
The purpose of this study was to compare the threat process experienced by two groups of 
taxpayers: (a) those caught up in mass marketed tax avoidance schemes (investor group); 
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and (b) those who had never been in conflict with the tax authority over the amount of tax 
they had to pay (conflict-free group). Two basic propositions derived from the ROAM 
model of taxation threat are to be tested. 
 
First, all three threat mentalities should be stronger for the scheme investors than for the 
conflict-free group. The justification for this set of hypotheses is that the act of paying tax 
creates a degree of internal conflict for an individual. The conflict involves taking on board 
the tax authority’s expectations of compliance, and at the same time, acting in a way that 
preserves personal self-worth. If taxpaying is ‘automated,’ handled by a tax professional 
and trouble-free, taxpayers will experience minimal, baseline taxation conflict. The 
conflict is likely to be elevated and made more salient when the tax authority informs 
taxpayers that they have not been paying their fair share and must pay more.  
 
When the mentality of regulation through self comes into play, the conflict is played out in 
the domain of morality and ethical behaviour. Internal sanctions such as guilt and shame 
boost this narrative, as does the external sanctioning system of penalties issued by the tax 
authority. Regulation through self attaches self-worth to acting in a fashion that is 
consistent with the tax authority’s wishes. Thus, we hypothesise that the investor group, in 
the middle of their conflict with the Tax Office, will be more strongly attracted to coping 
with the threat through regulation through self than the conflict-free group of taxpayers 
(Hypothesis 1). 
 
When the mentality of oppression comes into operation, the conflict the individual 
experiences is in relation to aspirations for material well-being, both in absolute terms and 
in relative terms. To do what the tax authority requires is to sacrifice personal goals and 
forego rewards that individuals believe they deserve. If individuals are being pressured to 
pay their tax debts by the tax authority, as was the case with the scheme investors, we can 
hypothesise that the investor group will be more likely to experience the tax threat 
mentality of oppression than the conflict-free group of taxpayers (Hypothesis 2). 
 
For the mentality of autonomy, the internal conflict involves rights, in this case the right to 
pay as little tax as is necessary under the law. When a tax authority challenges taxpayers 
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about the legality of their tax minimising efforts, it is more than likely that taxpayers will 
reaffirm their commitment to tax minimisation, even if at the same time they affirm 
commitment to honesty in their tax dealings. Thus, the investor group is expected to report 
greater autonomy from the tax authority in order to minimise tax than the conflict-free 
group of taxpayers, once commitment to honesty is controlled (Hypothesis 3). 
 
The second proposition subject to empirical analysis is that all three threat mentalities will 
be related to motivational posturing in the investor group, just as they are in the general 
population (Braithwaite, forthcoming). Should the regulation through self mentality gain 
supremacy, taxpayers are expected to adopt a more cooperative posture. Should oppression 
gain supremacy, resistance is likely to become more visible. Autonomy is the mentality that 
enables taxpayers to practice dissociation. Because theoretically all three mentalities have 
relevance in both compliant and non-compliant populations, there is no reason to suppose 
that the process by which threat influences social distance and posturing in the general 
population cannot be generalised to the population of scheme investors. Thus, we 
hypothesise that within the investor group, regulation through self will be associated with 
greater cooperation and lower resistance (Hypothesis 4), oppression will be associated with 
lower cooperation and greater resistance (Hypothesis 5) and autonomy will be associated 
with increased dissociation (Hypothesis 6). 
 
The threat mentalities can be helpful to tax authorities through encouraging a more 
cooperative relationship, or they can be damaging, creating social distance or rift in the 
form of resistance or dissociation. Should hypotheses 4 through 6 be supported, tax 
authorities have reason to feel concerned about creating more problems than they solve 
with their regulatory activities. Ideally, a tax authority, like any regulatory authority, would 
want to move the population systematically toward a regulation through self mentality and 
toward the posture of cooperation.  
 
While the tax authority may be at a loss to find a blanket treatment that is likely to be 
effective in managing all threat mentalities, previous research suggests that authorities gain 
considerable advantage if they prioritise the delivery of procedural justice in their 
regulatory activities (Tyler, 1990, 1997). On the basis of past research with mass marketed 
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scheme investors, Murphy (2003a) has found that perceptions of the Tax Office 
implementing procedural justice can increase trust and reduce resistance. Perceptions of 
procedural justice, however, are not expected to dampen the supra-posture of dissociation, 
because those who have dissociated have placed themselves outside or beyond the reach of 
the system (Braithwaite, 2001a, 2004; Braithwaite, Reinhart & McCrae, 2004). The final 
hypothesis, therefore, is that taxpayers in the investor group, like those in the general 
population, will resist the authority less and cooperate more when they perceive the 
authority behaving in accordance with the principles of procedural justice, and specifically 
the Taxpayers’ Charter (Hypothesis 7). 
 
IV. Research methodology 
 
Method 
 
The sample for testing these hypotheses was drawn from three sources. The investor group 
comprised respondents from the Australian Tax System Survey of Tax Scheme Investors 
conducted in 2002 (Murphy & Byng, 2002). A random sample of taxpayers involved in the 
schemes were contacted by the Tax Office and invited to participate in the research. Of 
those contacted, 43% accepted the invitation, providing a sample of 2292 respondents.  
 
The conflict-free group of taxpayers was drawn from two random general population 
surveys, the first conducted in 2000, The Community Hopes, Fears and Actions Survey 
(Braithwaite, 2001b; Braithwaite et al., 2001), and the second conducted in 2001-2 as part 
of The Australian Tax System - Fair or Not Survey. This second survey involved a follow-
up of the participants surveyed in 2000, along with a new random sample. Conflict-free 
taxpayers were drawn from the original data set and the new random sample. The conflict-
free group had indicated in their survey responses that they had not been involved in any 
kind of conflict nor had they any outstanding debt with the Tax Office at the time the 
survey was conducted. From the general population surveys, 2605 respondents were 
selected for further analysis. 
 
Clearly, in the conflict-free group we are relying on the honesty of respondents. While we 
have no way of verifying the truthfulness of these responses, it is of note that the 
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percentages involved in various kinds of tax offences, such as not filing a tax return, were 
of the order expected from best available knowledge (see Mearns & Braithwaite, 2001 for 
a detailed discussion of the representativeness of the sample and data quality).  
 
Measures 
 
The measures used to test the hypotheses regarding the differences between the conflict-
free group and the investor group were single questions and multi-item scales common to 
all three surveys. They have been described in detail elsewhere (see Braithwaite, 2001b; 
Braithwaite et al., 2001), and therefore are outlined only briefly below. 
 
Resistance-cooperation was measured through aggregating responses to 19 items which 
covered the three motivational posture scales of resistance (sample item: It’s important not 
to let the Tax Office push you around), capitulation (sample item: If you cooperate with the 
Tax Office, they are likely to be cooperative with you (reverse scored)), and commitment 
(sample item: Overall I pay my tax with good will (reverse scored)). Respondents rated 
each item on a 5 point strongly disagree to strongly agree rating scale. The alpha reliability 
coefficient based on the scales making up resistance-cooperation was 0.55. 
 
Dissociation was measured through aggregating responses to 10 items comprising the 
motivational posture scales of disengagement (sample item: If I find out that I am not 
doing what the Tax Office wants, I am not going to lose any sleep over it) and game 
playing (sample item: I like the game of finding the grey area of tax law). Each item was 
rated on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) rating scale. The alpha reliability 
coefficient based on the scales making up dissociation was 0.54. 
 
The index for assessing regulation through self was made up of five measures: (a) a four 
item scale representing an ethical taxpaying norm (sample item: Do you think it is 
acceptable to overstate tax deductions?); (b) a three item scale representing disapproval of 
tax cheating (sample item: If you found out an acquaintance was working for cash in hand 
payments, how likely is it that you would think it was wrong?) (c) a two item scale 
representing willingness to confront tax cheating (sample item: If you found out an 
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acquaintance was working for cash in hand payments, how likely is it that you would let 
them know that you disapproved?); (d) two scenarios X a nine item scale of shame 
acknowledgment (sample item: If you were caught and fined for not declaring cash income 
or over claiming deductions, would you feel guilty?); and (e) two scenarios X a nine item 
deterrence measure comprising the product term of likelihood of getting caught X 
likelihood of various sanctions X severity of problem associated with various sanctions. 
The alpha reliability coefficient for these five measures was 0.70. 
 
The index for oppression comprised four measures: (a) a three item scale representing 
being economically deprived (sample item: Paying tax means I just can’t get ahead); (b) a 
single item on the degree to which the respondent paid more than (or less than) their fair 
share; (c) a two item scale about receiving unfavourable Tax Office decisions (sample 
item: How often are the decisions of the Tax Office favourable to you? (reverse scored)); 
and (d) two scenarios X a four item scale of shame displacement (sample item: If you were 
caught and fined for not declaring cash income or over claiming deductions, would you 
feel angry with the Tax Office?). The alpha reliability coefficient for these four measures 
was 0.61 
 
The index for autonomy comprised three measures: (a) a single item measure of the effort 
put into minimising tax; (b) a single item measure of doing tax in different ways for the 
most tax effective outcome; and (c) a three item scale representing having an effective 
professional tax minimiser (sample item: My tax agent helps me interpret ambiguous or 
grey areas of the tax law in my favour). The alpha reliability coefficient for these three 
measures was 0.58. 
 
The procedural justice index was formed through combining four measures. The 
Australian Taxpayers’ Charter comprises 12 standards that set out taxpayer rights with 
regard to administrative procedures. Previous work has demonstrated that through 
summing the ratings that the taxpayer has given to the Tax Office on these standards, we 
obtain a good measure of success in delivering procedural justice (Braithwaite & Reinhart, 
2000). In addition, three other procedural justice scales were included in the overall index 
because of their specific relevance to regulating responsively and in a socially inclusive 
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manner: (a) consultation with the taxpaying community; (b) treating taxpayers as 
trustworthy; and (c) treating taxpayers with respect. The alpha reliability coefficient for 
these four measures was 0.88. 
 
Results 
 
First, the six independent variables comprising the supra-postures of resistance-cooperation 
and dissociation, the ROAM taxation threat variables (regulation through self, oppression 
and autonomy), and procedural justice were correlated with the dichotomous variable – 
whether the respondent belonged to the conflict-free group (baseline threat) or the investor 
group (heightened threat), using point-biserial correlation coefficients. These are presented 
in the second column of Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Point-biserial correlation coefficients and B coefficients from a logistic 
regression analysis predicting membership in conflict-free (0) or amended assessment 
(1) tax groups from supra-postures, ROAM, and procedural justice 
 
Predictor Point-biserial 
correlation 
B coefficient 
Resistance 0.39*** 0.76*** 
Dissociation -0.30*** -1.61*** 
Regulation through self 0.06*** 0.39*** 
Oppression 0.32*** 0.18* 
Autonomy 0.00 0.29*** 
Procedural justice -0.53*** -1.34*** 
Nagelkerke R2  0.46 
% correctly classified  77% 
* p < 0.05   *** p < 0.001 
 
Next, a logistic regression analysis was carried out predicting group membership (0 = 
conflict-free, 1 = investor) from the six independent variables. This analysis offered two 
advantages over the bivariate point-biserial coefficients. First, because of known 
differences in motivational posturing between the conflict-free and investor groups, it was 
important to control for these variables before testing the hypotheses relating to heightened 
ROAM responses in the investor group. Second, and more generally, this analysis allowed 
us to find out if each of the variables was useful in predicting membership in its own right. 
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For instance, it was conceivable that when we took out the known effects of resistance, 
dissociation and procedural justice, the threat variables would not be important at all. This 
would mean that while they still may have been part of people’s narratives about their 
dealings with the Tax Office, they were not adding any special insights into the analysis of 
difference between the groups. 
 
The findings of this analysis are presented in Table 1. From the column of B coefficients, 
we see that all six variables have a significant part to play in distinguishing the conflict-
free and investor groups and that these significant effects are in the expected direction. In 
accordance with the threat hypotheses, the investor group displays the three threat 
mentalities to a greater degree than the conflict-free group. The logistic regression analysis 
shows that when taxpayers come under the scrutiny of the tax authority and are given 
amended assessments involving the payment of more tax, interest and penalties, they resist 
more and cooperate less, they dissociate less because they have experienced first hand the 
power that the tax authority has over them, they claim greater capacity to regulate through 
the self, to feel oppressed by taxation and to express autonomy in managing tax matters, 
and they feel they have been treated with less procedural justice. 
 
Their heightened threat responses, their different motivational postures and their different 
perceptions of procedural justice indicate a set of sensibilities that make the mass marketed 
tax avoidance scheme investors a volatile group of taxpayers to manage. The next question 
is whether threat mentalities are related to motivational postures in the same way as they 
are among the general population, and if procedural justice counters the damage of threat 
mentalities to the relationship between taxpayers and the tax authority. 
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Table 2: Predicting resistance from control, ROAM and procedural justice variables 
for the amended tax assessment group (in brackets, the conflict-free group) 
 
Predictor Resistance 
 correlation beta coefficient 
Dissociation 0.19*** (0.28***) 0.15*** (0.15***) 
Regulation through self -0.18*** (-0.40***) -0.10*** (-0.16***) 
Oppression 0.51*** (0.51***) 0.22*** (0.19***) 
Autonomy 0.06*** (0.13***) 0.04* (0.04**) 
Procedural justice -0.67*** (-0.72***) -0.58*** (-0.57***) 
R2  0.55*** (0.61***) 
* p < 0.05   ** p < 0.01   *** p < 0.001 
 
Table 3: Predicting dissociation from control, ROAM and procedural justice 
variables for the amended tax assessment group (in brackets, the conflict-free group) 
 
Predictor Dissociation 
 beta correlation beta coefficient 
Resistance 0.19*** (0.28***) 0.27*** (0.31***) 
Regulation through self -0.28*** (-0.26***) -0.18*** (-0.17***) 
Oppression 0.11*** (0.15***) 0.08*** (0.03) 
Autonomy 0.33*** (0.26***) 0.27*** (0.21***) 
Procedural justice 0.05** (-0.10***) 0.25*** (0.20***) 
R2  0.21*** (0.17***) 
** p < 0.01    *** p < 0.001 
 
Tables 2 and 3 present the results of two ordinary least squares multiple regression 
analyses, the first predicting resistance-cooperation (Table 2), the second predicting 
dissociation (Table 3). In predicting resistance, dissociation is used as a control variable, 
and vice versa for the prediction of dissociation. The reason for taking this step is that the 
two supra-postures are not entirely independent of each other, and by using one as a 
control in the prediction of the other, we remove the common variance that can ‘muddy’ 
the results. 
 
The investor sample is used for the main analysis, but in brackets are the corresponding 
coefficients for the conflict-free group. A comparison reveals that the relationships among 
the threat mentalities, procedural justice and the motivational postures are comparable for 
the two groups of taxpayers. The following description of results focuses on the primary 
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group of interest in this analysis, taxpayers belonging to the mass marketed tax avoidance 
scheme sample (the investor group). 
 
All predictors of the supra-posture of resistance (versus cooperation) are significant 
(Column 3, Table 2). Resistance is more pronounced when taxpayers have dissociated 
from the tax system and when they see little procedural justice being offered by the tax 
authority. Above and beyond these predictors, we see evidence of the tax threat mentalities 
accounting for location along the resistance-cooperation dimension. Oppression brings 
greater resistance. Even autonomy has a slight relationship with resistance. Regulation 
through self works in the opposite direction, bringing higher levels of cooperation.  
 
All predictors of the supra-posture of dissociation are also significant (Column 3, Table 3). 
Dissociation is higher when resistance is high, when oppression and autonomy are high, 
and when regulation through self is low. Oppression was expected to be strongly related to 
resistance, and less so to dissociation. The findings are consistent with this prediction. The 
most surprising finding was that when taxpayers see the tax authority carrying out its 
operations in accordance with principles of procedural justice, dissociation is high. 
Procedural justice was hypothesised as being irrelevant to dissociation, not positively 
related to dissociation. The most likely explanation is that in the world of those who have 
dissociated and who see the authority as having no control or power over them, either 
morally or legally, procedural justice is perceived by regulatees as a sign of weakness and 
of an authority that does not know what else it can do. Alternatively, in the case of the 
scheme investors, the Tax Office may have been seen as going through the motions, 
engaging in impression management rather than genuinely respectful treatment of 
taxpayers. Investor outrage at this pretence may have caused them to dissociate even more. 
Further research is required to put these speculative interpretations to the test. 
 
The regression analyses show that the threat mentality of regulation through self is the 
most important lever that a tax authority has at its disposal to improve its relations with its 
regulatory community. Regulation through self, it will be recalled, brings together high 
personal taxpaying ethics, awareness of external punishment that can be used against those 
who break the law, an internalised conscience of guilt-shame should a person become a 
 24
law breaker, and disapproval of those who shirk their taxpaying responsibilities. The 
synergy of these factors has been recognised previously in the tax domain (Grasmick & 
Bursik), and their importance is captured by Frey and his colleagues through the term, tax 
morale (Frey & Feld, 2002).  
 
The reasons why a tax authority should value regulation through self above all else are 
twofold. Regulation through self builds firstly cooperation, and second, it undermines 
dissociation. This is not meant to downplay the importance of procedural justice, which 
clearly is associated with lower resistance and greater cooperation. But procedural justice 
will not help a tax authority that is battling problems of dissociation. To put it another way, 
how individuals are treated carries less sway when they doubt the legitimacy of the 
authority and what it has to offer (Braithwaite, 2004). 
 
The remaining findings from the logistic regression and the ordinary least squares 
regression analyses demonstrate the ways in which elevated threat mentalities make a tax 
authority’s job harder. Oppression is a tax mentality that increases both resistance and 
dissociation. Similarly, asserting autonomy through using tax effective strategies presents 
problems for tax administrations, most notably in the area of dissociation. Oppression and 
autonomy are not helpful threat mentalities from the tax authority’s perspective, and yet 
they are likely to increase for some of the people some of the time, when a tax authority 
takes its enforcement responsibilities seriously. The outcome of heightened oppression and 
autonomy is inevitable, alongside heightened regulation through self. 
 
V. Conclusions 
 
Through integrating the findings of this paper we have an opportunity for better 
appreciating the place of responsive regulation in the domain of taxation compliance. The 
task of integration reveals the complexity of the enforcement challenge for regulators. 
When a tax authority shows interest in taking action against a group of taxpayers, all threat 
responses are heightened, those that are desirable for effective regulation (regulation 
through self) and those that are undesirable (oppression and autonomy).  
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Yet, the observant, cost-effective tax administrator will be quick to point out that the data 
suggest that on average, the tax authority has done a reasonable job in managing its mass 
marketed tax avoidance schemes controversy. Overall, dissociation for the investor group 
is lower than for the conflict-free group, and this is surely a consequence of their being the 
focus of Tax Office attention. (This is based on what we think is a reasonable assumption, 
that investor taxpayers would not be less dissociated than the general population before the 
controversy started (see Braithwaite, Reinhart & McCrae, 2004).) What is more, higher 
resistance among investors is to be expected. Regulators regularly encounter resistance and 
a considerable body of research has now accumulated showing that resistance can be 
managed reasonably effectively through procedural justice. So, from the perspective of the 
regulator, should we pay attention to threat mentalities and the complexities they introduce 
into the analysis? 
 
The answer to this question is that we should, the reason being that regulatory efforts are 
designed not only to send a social message about what is appropriate today, but also to 
modify our actions in the future. It is comforting for a tax authority to know that their 
scheme investors are observing regulation through self and less dissociation, and also that 
regulation through self protects against dissociation and increases cooperation. But it is 
probably a mistake to hold the view that mass marketed scheme investors are more 
‘dutiful’ by nature, and that they will espouse such dutifulness in the future. We think it is 
most likely that our legal institutions bring this mentality of conscience, fear and 
subservience to the fore. As one of our colleagues who is a tax barrister tells it: “They 
come to me and say, I am an honest man. And I say to them, ‘I hope you will be from now 
on.’” The implication, of course, is that legal institutions bring out a regulation through self 
mentality and a law abiding identity. Once outside the reach of the law, however, other 
competing identities become salient and the narratives of oppression and autonomy 
resurface to shape our thinking. 
 
If our analysis is valid - there needs to be substantially more effort directed toward testing 
these ideas in different contexts - the regulator’s challenge is to strengthen a regulation 
through self mentality across time and place. The challenge can only be met through 
strategically linking persuasion and punishment. First and foremost, people need to be 
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convinced that they have broken the law and that it would be better for everyone if they 
were to do the right thing in the future. Interestingly, the mass marketed tax avoidance 
scheme investors did not think that they were in any way at fault in their conflict with the 
tax authority. Changing people’s minds means dialogue, persuasion, perhaps even 
changing the law, and clear explication of the costs of acting outside the law. These are 
goals for intervention that are undertaken at the bottom of the regulatory pyramid. Threats 
that oppress or trigger a quest for greater autonomy are not helpful when the regulator’s 
task is to create stronger commitment to paying tax. 
 
The results of the analyses presented in this paper, however, are also a reminder that the 
above narrative does not apply to everyone. There is nothing neat and systematic in how 
people respond to threat. While the investor group as a whole may have scored lower on 
dissociation than the general population, there are bound to be high scorers among them, 
and there is the danger that all manner of persuasion will fail for some people and 
resistance will turn into dissociation. Continuing commitment to procedural justice will be 
part of the answer, but all problems cannot be solved at this level and to persist in relying 
solely on procedural justice is not going to be an effective management strategy. Processes 
offering procedural justice and dialogue need to be paired with enforcement action. In 
other words, escalation will be required up the regulatory pyramid to deal with some 
persistent cases of defiance.  
 
All of this is to recognise that people’s narratives about themselves are complex, and there 
is no blanket treatment from a regulator that can effectively cast these narratives out of 
existence. But narratives can be reconstructed (Maruna, 2001). Tax authorities would be 
wise to broaden their remit of law enforcement. They need to understand the narratives of 
their regulatory communities, put down their big sticks, roll up their sleeves and engage in 
dialogue about what tax law means and whose interests it serves. 
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